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ABSTRACT—Counterfactual reasoning (CFR)—mentally
representing what the world would be like now if things
had been different in the past—is an important aspect of
human cognition and the focus of research in areas such
as philosophy, social psychology, and clinical psychology.
More recently, it has also gained broad interest in cogni-
tive developmental psychology, mainly focusing on the
question of how this kind of reasoning can be character-
ized. Studies have been inconsistent in identifying when
children can use CFR. In this article, we present theoreti-
cal positions that may account for this inconsistency and
evaluate them in the light of research on counterfactual
emotions.
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COUNTERFACTUAL REASONING IN EVERYDAY LIFE
Counterfactual reasoning (CFR) involves mentally representing
how the world would be now if things had been different in the
past. In everyday discourse, we express counterfactual thoughts
in the form of conditional statements; for example: “If p, then q”
or “If we had not been interested in counterfactuals, then we
would not be writing this paper.” Using conditionals, we indi-
cate that the true nature of the antecedent p is suppositional and
that q should be assessed within that context (Evans, Over, &
Handley, 2005). In our example, the counterfactual supposition
p considers a world in which we were not interested in counter-
factuals. At this point, the conclusion q—that we would not be
writing this paper—is not drawn randomly; we retain as many
features of the past as possible and change only those that are
causally dependent on the counterfactual supposition (Edging-
ton, 2011). For instance, as a consequence, we would not have
read papers on counterfactuals, nor would we have run studies
to investigate counterfactuals; hence, we would not have had
anything to write about. Modeling a counterfactual world in this
manner has been referred to as the nearest possible world con-
straint (Lewis, 1973). With CFR, we refer to this constraint that
“involves a change in some features of the actual world in addi-
tion to those required by the truth of the antecedent of the
counterfactual, while other such features are left unchanged”
(Woodward, 2011, p. 21).
CFR IN VARIOUS DISCIPLINES
CFR has received attention in philosophy, social psychology,
and clinical psychology. Intuitively—and many philosophers
defend this position—CFR is closely related to our understand-
ing of causality. For example, to counterfactually suppose that
“if a piece of metal had not burst its tire, the Concorde would
not have crashed” supports our understanding that the piece of
metal caused the Concorde to crash (for a review, see Hoerl,
McCormack, & Beck, 2011).
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CHILD DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES
In contrast, social psychologists have focused on counterfactu-
al emotions such as regret, relief, remorse, blame, and dis-
appointment. Regret plays a key role in shaping our decision
making (for a review, see Joseph-Williams, Edwards, & Elwyn,
2011) and serves as a corrective to improve behavior (Epstude
& Roese, 2008). For example, people who anticipate regret over
missing their train leave early to prevent feeling regret (with the
beneficial side effect of not missing their train). Although CFR
is a feature of normal cognition, clinical psychology has linked
it to pathological processes such as depression (Markman &
Weary, 1998), social anxiety (Kocovski, Endler, Rector, & Flett,
2005), procrastination (Sirois, 2004), Parkinson’s disease
(McNamara, Durso, Brown, & Lynch, 2003), and schizophrenia
(Hooker, Roese, & Park, 2000).
More recently, CFR has become a hot topic in cognitive
developmental psychology. Children’s ability to engage in rea-
soning with counterfactual conditionals seems to be related to
their ability to infer another person’s false belief (Guajardo, Par-
ker, & Turley-Ames, 2009; Guajardo & Turley-Ames, 2004;
Riggs, Peterson, Robinson, & Mitchell, 1998; but see Perner,
Sprung, & Steinkogler, 2004), an important step toward social
understanding. Children diagnosed with autism have problems
with false belief tasks, as well as with counterfactual condition-
als (Grant, Riggs, & Boucher, 2004; Scott, Baron-Cohen, & Les-
lie, 1999). Counterfactuals also seem to play a role in
attributing moral emotions: Four- to 8-year-olds attributed more
negative emotions to the violator of a moral norm when a count-
erfactual course of action was presented beforehand (e.g., “How
would Tim feel if he had not taken the chocolate?”) than when
no such counterfactual prompt was given (Gummerum, Cribbett,
Nicolau, & Uren, 2013). In light of these important develop-
mental links, we need to better understand how to characterize
CFR.
DEVELOPMENTAL STUDIES OF CFR: STATE OF THE
ART
The developmental context allows us to understand what hap-
pens in the mind when we apply CFR. For example, if we claim
that for CFR, children need to understand that they should
change only features of reality that are causally dependent on
the counterfactual supposition, we should expect children who
lack this understanding to produce a different answer. When
can we be sure that an answer to a counterfactual question—
produced by a child—is reached using CFR? We argue that
these are answers (a) that most adults would agree on and (b)
that cannot be produced by any reasoning strategy other than
CFR.
Very young children seem to be able to fulfil the first crite-
rion. For example, in a study, 3-year-olds were shown Carol, a
puppet, coming home and not taking her dirty shoes off, leaving
footprints on the clean floor. When asked counterfactually, “If
Carol had taken her dirty shoes off, would the floor be clean or
dirty?” most 3-year-olds answered “clean” (Harris, German, &
Mills, 1996). Most adults draw the same inference (Rafetseder,
Schwitalla, & Perner, 2013).
However, 3- to 5-year-olds (and even older children) have
problems answering in accordance with CFR when one controls
for false positives, provided by simpler reasoning strategies that
lead to the same answer as CFR (Rafetseder, Cristi-Vargas, &
Perner, 2010; Rafetseder & Perner, 2010; Rafetseder et al.,
2013). For example, in a study like the one just described, chil-
dren saw Carol and Max dirtying a clean floor. When asked, “If
Carol had taken her dirty shoes off, would the floor be clean or
dirty?” adolescents and adults agreed that the floor would be
“dirty”; it would have been dirtied by Max. However, 5-year-
olds answered this way in only 18% of the cases, and 7- to 10-
year-olds in only about 50% of the cases (Rafetseder et al.,
2013); they did not preserve the real course of events as closely
as possible (i.e., they did not consider that Max dirtied the clean
floor independently of Carol).
In the next section, we consider several theoretical positions
that address why younger children fail to adhere to CFR.
THEORETICAL POSITIONS
Some argue that the difference between younger and older chil-
dren reflects developmental improvements in executive function-
ing, specifically in inhibitory control, cognitive flexibility, and
working memory. Some counterfactual tasks put fewer executive
demands on children’s cognitive systems than others, allowing
them to solve some tasks earlier than others. Support for this
notion comes from various studies (inhibitory control: Beck,
Riggs, & Gorniak, 2009; cognitive flexibility: Burns, Riggs, &
Beck, 2012; working memory: Guajardo et al., 2009). In the ear-
lier example with Carol and Max, children whose working mem-
ory is not yet fully developed might have just forgotten to
consider Max’s dirty footprints.
However, consider two counterarguments: (a) Children find
tasks that require an understanding of the nearest possible world
constraint more difficult than tasks that do not require this
understanding, even when the tasks are similar in structure,
length, and complexity, suggesting comparable demands of
executive functioning (Rafetseder et al., 2010), and (b) children
who understand the nearest possible world constraint do not dif-
fer in their executive functioning capacities from children who
do not yet have this understanding (Pohn & Ramsdorf, 2013).
Together, these suggest that effective executive functioning abil-
ities are not sufficient to answer counterfactual questions and
that tasks similar in executive functioning demands can vary in
difficulty.
A different strand of research assumes that young children,
unlike older children and adults, (a) do not engage automati-
cally in CFR or (b) have their CFR triggered by different
events, compared to older children’s and adults’ CFR (Beck,
Weisberg, Burns, & Riggs, 2013). The first explanation is sup-
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ported by the fact that young children answer counterfactual
questions correctly before they experience regret (Beck & Cril-
ly, 2009); young children may have not automatically applied
CFR on tasks that induce regret. The second explanation is
supported by a study (Guttentag & Ferrell, 2004) in which 7-
year-olds and adults usually believed Person A, who acted atyp-
ically, will feel worse about a negative outcome than Person B,
who acted typically. Five-year-olds, in contrast, thought that the
two people would feel equally bad. However, the second expla-
nation does not account for performance differences between
conditions that seem to have the same triggers (e.g., if Carol
had taken her shoes off) but that differ in their demand for
whether children have to adhere to the nearest possible world
constraint.
Our study provides yet another explanation for the develop-
mental discrepancy (Rafetseder & Perner, 2010; Rafetseder
et al., 2010; Rafetseder et al., 2013). Counterfactual tasks that
are passed early in life can be solved by simpler reasoning strat-
egies, referred to as basic conditional reasoning (BCR), whereas
those that are passed later can be solved only by CFR.
FORMAL CHARACTERIZATION OF CFR AND BCR
Children’s problem with counterfactual tasks lies in their lack of
understanding the nearest possible world constraint (Perner &
Rafetseder, 2011; Rafetseder et al., 2010; Rafetseder et al.,
2013): One should assume that the counterfactual world is
exactly like the real world except for those facts that are incom-
patible with the counterfactual assumption (antecedent). In par-
ticular, one should change only facts that depend logically or
causally on the counterfactual assumption.
To illustrate this difference (Rafetseder et al., 2010, Study 1),
consider a mother who sometimes placed candy on the top shelf
and sometimes placed it on the bottom shelf. Her tall son could
reach both shelves, but his little sister could reach only the bottom
shelf. In the condition in which only CFR gave the correct answer,
the mother placed the candy on the top shelf and the boy took it to
his room. Adults and 6-year-olds differed in their answer to the
counterfactual questions: “What if the little girl had come instead
of the boy? Where would the candy be?” Most of the children said
the candy would have ended up in the girl’s room (BCR), whereas
all adults agreed that it would have stayed on the top shelf (CFR).
To answer the counterfactual question correctly, one has to con-
sider where the mother had placed the candy (on the top shelf). In
contrast, the 6-year-olds did not consider this information, thereby
violating the nearest possible world constraint.
When the mother put the candy on the bottom shelf and the
boy came to get it, children were asked where the candy would
be if the girl had come instead. This time, BCR (not relating to
what really happened) led the children to the same answer as
CFR, namely, “girl’s room.” Even the youngest children were
able to answer the counterfactual questions correctly without
having to use CFR.
A formal description of how younger and older children
approach counterfactual tasks (Leahy, Rafetseder, & Perner,
2013) assumes that older children and adults understand that
the counterfactual antecedent is meant to contradict what
actually happened in the last episode to which the question
refers. And it assumes that they reason about what would be
the case if that episode had taken place except for the
changes stipulated by the counterfactual assumption (and
changes made necessary by logical consequences). In contrast,
younger children simply treat the antecedent as the descrip-
tion of a new episode in the story: If (at some time) the girl
comes in search of candy, she will bring it to her room. In
doing so, they are not faced with a contradiction. Some chil-
dren understand this constraint at age 6, whereas others do so
at older ages (Rafetseder & Perner, 2010; Rafetseder et al.,
2010; Rafetseder et al., 2013).
WHEN DO CHILDREN FEEL COUNTERFACTUAL
EMOTIONS?
Additional insights concerning children’s CFR abilities come
from their ability to experience counterfactual emotions—which
involve comparing what is the case with what could have been the
case. If things could have been better, one might feel regret; if
things could have been worse, one might feel relief. Counterfactu-
al emotion tasks do not hinge on verbal counterfactual questions
and therefore might detect early CFR abilities more accurately.
Only a few studies have reported signs of counterfactual emo-
tions in 5- to 6-year-olds (Weisberg & Beck, 2010, 2012, Study
2) or younger (Weisberg & Beck, 2012, Study 1). Other studies
have found counterfactual emotions later, in 6- to 7-year-olds
(Amsel & Smalley, 2000; Burns et al., 2012; Guttentag & Fer-
rell, 2004; O’Connor, McCormack, & Feeney, 2012) or older
children (Ferrell, Guttentag, & Gredlein, 2009), with progressive
development during late childhood and adolescence (Habib
et al., 2012; Rafetseder & Perner, 2012).
To detect when children feel negative counterfactual emo-
tions, researchers give them the choice between two boxes. After
the children choose, the box is opened and children receive a
prize (e.g., a sticker), then see the contents of the box they did
not choose. This box contains either the same amount of stickers
(baseline condition) or more stickers (worse off condition). Sub-
sequently, children are asked to rate how happy they feel with
the prize they got. Children who rate themselves less happy in
the worse off condition than in the baseline condition are con-
sidered to have experienced regret.
However, this paradigm is liable to alternative explanations,
including that children’s pattern of answers might be because of
the contrast effect (K€uhberger, Großbichler, & Wimmer, 2011);
that is, a prize appears better or worse depending on what it is
compared to. One sticker is evaluated as less positive in view of
four stickers (worse off condition) than in view of one sticker
(baseline condition).
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Two studies are not liable to this effect: More 5- to 8-year-
old children rated their prize lower in the worse off condition
when they were allowed to actively choose between two
options than when it was decided with a die or by the
experimenter (Weisberg & Beck, 2012). The contrast effect
would predict that children rate their prize lower regardless of
how it was decided.
However, a second study casts doubt on children experiencing
regret before they are 6–7 years old (O’Connor, McCormack, &
Feeney, 2013). Children were given the standard baseline and
worse off conditions on consecutive days. On the second day,
they were asked to choose the box they had chosen the previous
day without paying for the choice, or to switch to the other box
and pay one token. It was hypothesized that children would
more likely switch adaptively (i.e., stick to the original choice in
the baseline condition, but switch in the worse off condition)
when they had experienced regret on the first day. In other
words, they were expected to take corrective action to avoid
feeling bad again. Of those who felt worse in the worse off con-
dition on the first day, no 5-year-old but two thirds of the 7-
year-olds and almost all of the 9-year-olds adaptively switched.
Presumably, the 5-year-olds in this study did not experience
regret.
SUMMARY AND FINAL THOUGHTS
In this article, we argue that 6-year-olds are only beginning to
develop a full-fledged understanding of CFR and that younger
children treat the counterfactual question as a description of a
new episode (BCR) rather than a change to one that has actually
happened (CFR). However, this change in conceptual under-
standing is crucial for children to be able to experience true
counterfactual emotions. The precise emergence of counterfactu-
al emotions is difficult to pinpoint and still open for debate, but
children may not experience negative counterfactual emotions
before age 6.
Children’s ability to reason with false belief may be based on
their ability to reason with counterfactual conditionals (Riggs
et al., 1998). If the world were as it is perceived by an agent
(“Peter’s wife sees him staying sick in bed and does not hear of
either the fire or see him go to fight the fire”), then it would be
as the agent believes it to be (“Peter would be still in bed”).
Children who can answer a counterfactual question (“Where
would Peter be, if there had been no fire?”) using BCR will also
answer correctly the question about Peter’s wife’s belief (“Where
does his wife think he is?”). If a child who is faced with a more
intricate scenario needs CFR to answer the counterfactual ques-
tion correctly, then children will have the same difficulty (or
even more) answering the question about an agent’s belief until
they are 6 or older.
One could also expect a parallel development between CFR
and scientific reasoning abilities. A fundamental element in
scientific reasoning is differentiating variables that are causally
relevant for the observed outcome from variables that are not.
For example, to determine whether the piece of metal was the
only causally relevant factor for the Concorde to crash, one
would need to manipulate this factor while holding all other
independent variables constant. This amounts to the nearest
possible world constraint.
Thus, our model of CFR provides a novel insight into how
children understand counterfactuality and makes clear predic-
tions about when children are able to experience counterfactual
emotions, draw conclusions within other people’s perspectives,
and show elaborate scientific reasoning skills.
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